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Crowdsourcing City Government:
Using Tournaments to Improve Inspection Accuracy
By Edward L. Glaeser, Andrew Hillis, Scott Duke Kominers, and Michael Luca∗
Big data and predictive analytics have
the potential to make cities more efficient.
Yet cities often lack the resources to use
new data and methods effectively, and pri-
vate researchers often lack the incentives to
help solve the problems that cities face.
New platforms—such as Kaggle, Top-
Coder, and DrivenData—now enable gov-
ernments and other organizations to out-
source large-scale prediction problems via
open tournaments. But can open tourna-
ments really help solve public problems?
In this paper, we theoretically and em-
pirically explore the potential of prediction
tournaments to improve city operations and
translate data science insights into practice.
In Section I, we present a formal model
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that compares tournaments to outsourcing
via consultancy. We show that tourna-
ments are preferable when (1) the city is
comfortable with project risk and (2) there
is an abundant supply of labor willing to
work in exchange for a chance of public
recognition and a moderate prize.
In Section II, we describe the design and
initial results of an open tournament that
we ran in collaboration with the City of
Boston, Yelp, and DrivenData. Our contest
awarded financial prizes for the algorithms
that most effectively used Yelp review text
to predict Boston restaurant health and
sanitation violations.1 Over seven hundred
people signed up for the tournament, and
fifty-five ultimately contributed at least one
set of predictions, submitting a total of 449
sets of predictions. We then tested twenty-
three “final” algorithm submissions out-of-
sample, comparing their predictions to the
true results of the 364 restaurant inspec-
tions conducted over a six-week period af-
ter the close of submissions. The evidence
suggests that using the winning algorithms
to identify restaurants to inspect could in-
crease inspection efficacy significantly: We
estimate that the City of Boston could be
30%-50% more productive if it allocated in-
spections as suggested by a top-performing
algorithm from the tournament.
In Section III, we discuss general lessons
for cities seeking to implement prediction
tournaments. We conclude in Section IV.
I. A Brief Model of Tournaments
This section develops a framework for
cities (and other organizations) that are de-
1Earlier research has provided evidence suggesting
that Yelp text could be used to make inspections more
efficient (Kang et al., 2013); however, prior to our work,
(to our knowledge) this insight had not been incorpo-
rated into city inspection processes.
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ciding whether to use a tournament to de-
velop a product—in our application con-
text, a predictive algorithm. The tourna-
ments we study have two essential features:
(1) they are open to all, and (2) they task
all participants with the same goal.2
As an alternative to running a tourna-
ment, the government can choose to con-
tract with a consultancy that will receive
fixed compensation as long it produces a
product above some specified quality level.
We constrain both the consulting and the
tournament contract to have simple con-
tracting structures, in line with historical
norms and the non-verifiable nature of in-
novation quality.
The city chooses an option that maxi-
mizes the expected value of V (q) − Cost,
where q is the produced quality level. All
actors are assumed to be risk neutral. Con-
sulting companies compete for government
contracts, and earn no expected rents in
equilibrium; hence, they deliver the lowest-
cost means of achieving any fixed level of
quality. In a tournament, workers will enter
to the point at which their expected returns
equal their opportunity costs of time.
Each worker is of either high or low skill.
High-skilled workers and low-skilled work-
ers respectively have opportunity costs of
time equal to w and w. When performing
the task, high-skilled workers offer a mini-
mum quality level of q and low-skilled work-
ers offer a minimum quality level of q. With
probability ϕ either type of worker can
achieve a “breakthrough” that increases
output quality to qmax, which is greater
than q.3
2Thus, our tournaments roughly correspond the set-
tings of most online tournament platforms, as well as
tournaments used by companies like Netflix and re-
searchers in fields like computational biology. Such tour-
naments are sometimes modeled as all-pay auctions, but
the prior work has focused on questions of optimal mech-
anism/prize design, rather than on the types of prob-
lems best solved via contests (see, e.g., Che and Gale
(2003); Siegel (2009)). By contrast, our tournaments
are quite different from those historically modeled by
economists (Lazear and Rosen, 1981), in which workers
compete to contribute to a firm’s productivity by per-
forming non-identical tasks and being promoted within
the firm based on their relative achievement.
3Our risk assumption serves to make tournament
more attractive—the case for tournaments relies on the
In a consulting contract, there are three
plausible values for the minimum quality
level: q, q, and qmax. As consulting com-
panies offer to fulfill the contract at its ex-
pected cost, the contract that specifies q
will cost w; the contract that specifies q
will cost q; and the contract that spec-
ifies qmax will cost
w
ϕ
. We assume that
w
ϕ
> w. If V (q) − V (q) > w−w
1−ϕ and
w
ϕ−w
1−ϕ >
V (qmax)−V (q), then the city will prefer the
high-quality consulting contract to either
the low-quality contract or the maximum-
quality contract.
If the city runs a tournament, then it
posts reward value R that is granted to
the participant who delivers the highest-
quality project.4 A tournament with re-
ward R attracts N = N(R) participants.
In theory, the participants may be all high-
skilled workers (in which case N = R
w
and
w > w−w(1−ϕ)Rw ) or all low-skilled work-
ers (in which case N = R
w
and w − R(1 −
ϕ)
R
w > w) or a mixture of both types (in
which case R(1−(1−ϕ)
N )
N
+ R(1−ϕ)
N
NH
= w and
R(1−(1−ϕ)N )
N
= w).
We focus on tournaments that only at-
tract low-skilled workers; such tournaments
arise when wage inequality is large. In this
case, the tournament sponsor chooses R to
maximize
(1−ϕ)RwV (q)+
(
1− (1− ϕ)Rw
)
V (qmax)−R.
We consider the tradeoff between a con-
sulting contract and a tournament that
both cost the same amount.
If the consultancy and the tournament
both pay w, and wage inequality is high, the
tournament attracts w
w
unskilled workers.
In this case, the tournament dominates the
consultancy if and only if (1−ϕ)1−ww − 1 >
V (q)−V (q)
V (qmax)−V (q) .
5 We then find:
existence of workers with some upside potential who
have low opportunity costs of time.
4If multiple workers “win” the tournament by deliv-
ering the same highest level of quality, then they split
the reward.
5If the consulting contract pays w, then a tourna-
ment that pays the same amount yields the same result
as the consultancy, as both draw only one low-skilled
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PROPOSITION 1: There exists a value of
ϕ, denoted ϕ∗, at which the returns to the
tournament are the same as the returns
to the consulting contract. For values of
ϕ > ϕ∗, the tournament dominates the con-
sultancy and for values of ϕ < ϕ∗, the con-
sultancy dominates the tournament. The
value of ϕ∗ increases in V (q) and decreases
with V (q), V (qmax), and
w
w
.
Proposition 1 tells us that tournaments
make sense when the probability of a break-
through, ϕ, is relatively high. The range
of values which make tournaments attrac-
tive increases with V (q), V (qmax), and
w
w
.
That is, tournaments are more appealing
when the baseline low-skilled outcome is
not that bad, and when the best-possible
outcome is particularly good. Wage in-
equality also makes tournaments more ap-
pealing, as tournaments attract workers
with a particularly low opportunity cost
of time. When cities want to ensure that
they achieve at least the middle outcome,
q, tournaments are less attractive.
Our model suggests that the appeal
of tournaments depends on wage inequal-
ity and the public sector tolerance for
risk. Tournaments thus may be particu-
larly attractive in the 21st century, because
there are now many information technology
workers, particularly in developing coun-
tries, with relatively low opportunity costs
of time. The second factor that drives the
appeal of tournaments is the public toler-
ance for risk. When running a tournament,
the city must be willing to trade a reduced
chance of getting a middling outcome for an
increased probability of getting an outcome
in the upper and lower tails.
II. A Restaurant Hygiene Prediction
Tournament
Building on preliminary evidence of Kang
et al. (2013), we partnered with the City of
Boston, Yelp, and DrivenData to run an
open tournament to source algorithms for
worker. If the consulting contract pays w
ϕ
, then the
tournament is clearly dominated as it does not guaran-
tee maximal quality, while the consulting contract does.
predicting restaurant hygiene and sanita-
tion violations from Yelp reviews. Partic-
ipants in the tournament had twelve weeks
to develop algorithms for predicting hygiene
violations from Yelp data. While develop-
ing their algorithms, participants had ac-
cess to a dataset recording 34,879 City of
Boston hygiene inspections, dating back to
April 2006, and a linked set of Yelp.com
reviews, ratings, and business attributes
for Boston restaurants recorded over the
same time period. In Phase I (“Develop-
ment Phase”), participants developed pre-
dictive algorithms based on historical data.
During this phase, participants could share
their predictive performance publicly on
the DrivenData website, which ranked the
highest performers to date. Over seven-
hundred people registered for the tourna-
ment. Fifty-five competitors completed the
Development phase, submitting a total of
449 sets of predictions. At the end of
the Development Phase, participants sub-
mitted “final algorithms” for evaluation.
Twenty-three competitors, submitted a to-
tal of 36 separate final algorithms. In
Phase II (“Evaluation Phase”), the final al-
gorithms were evaluated according to their
effectiveness in predicting the outcomes of
inspections conducted in a six-week test pe-
riod that started after final algorithm sub-
mission. Algorithm performance was mea-
sured by root mean squared logarithmic
error (RMSLE).6 The winning algorithm’s
designer received $3,000; the second- and
third-place algorithms’ designers each re-
ceived $1,000; prize money was provided by
Yelp.
The winner of the tournament was a
data scientist based in the United King-
dom; her submission used the statistical
program R to implement an average of pre-
6To compute this scoring function, we first collapsed
the prediction for each restaurant i into a unidimen-
sional prediction Yˆi, by weighting the number of minor
(1x), major (2x), and severe (5x) violations. We also
computed the actual (weighted) numbers of violations
Yi that were found during the test period. The perfor-
mance metric was
RMSLE =
√
1
#Restaurants
∑
i
(
log(Yˆi + 1)− log(Yi + 1)
)2
.
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dictions from a random forest model and
gradient-boosted model with decision trees.
The runner-up was a Ph.D. student in Mar-
keting Analytics from the Netherlands; his
submission used Python to implement a
random forest model. Just as our theory
model predicts, the tournament was effec-
tive in large part because it sourced contri-
butions from a broad array of participants.
While the tournament itself scored sub-
missions according to a standard pre-
diction performance metric—RMSLE—the
outcome for the City of Boston is best mea-
sured in terms of productivity. That is:
How much can using predictive algorithms
improve inspector allocation?
During the testing period, the City in-
spected 364 restaurants, uncovering 1,593
minor violations, 153 major violations, and
341 severe violations, for a total of 3,604 to-
tal weighted violations. We predict that if
the City had used the algorithms to priori-
tize 364 restaurants to inspect from the uni-
verse of restaurants available in the data, it
would have found 5,406 weighted violations
(4,756 using the runner-up)—50% more vi-
olations than were found using the base-
line inspector allocation system (32% more
using the runner-up).7 Thus, we estimate
that the City of Boston would be 30%-50%
more productive using a top-performing al-
gorithm from the tournament. We are cur-
rently testing the winning algorithms’ effi-
cacy in practice, using a field experiment
that integrates the winning algorithms into
Boston’s process for allocating inspectors.
III. Designing Prediction Problems
and Tournaments
In this section, we draw upon our the-
ory work and experience in Boston to offer
general advice cities should consider when
designing prediction tournaments.
7Alternatively, had the city used the winning algo-
rithm to prioritize restaurants for inspection, it could
have inspected only 219 restaurants (249 using the
runner-up), reducing the number of inspections by 40%
(32%) while identifying the same number of weighted
violations and risks.
A. Problem Selection and Setup
Prediction tournaments are most ef-
fective for solving well-defined prediction
problems for which large data sets are avail-
able (either to the tournament organizer,
or through external sources). For the case
of hygiene prediction, for example, decid-
ing which restaurants to inspect directly in-
volves an element of prediction, yet inspec-
tions had not incorporated systematic pre-
dictive efforts in the past. Moreover, hy-
giene prediction provided us with an op-
portunity to incorporate new digital data
sources (Yelp reviews), offering at least the
possibility of significant improvements in
predictive accuracy.
Cities can incorporate algorithms into
many of their operational processes that in-
volve prediction. Because algorithms are
extremely literal and do not make im-
plicit tradeoffs the way that a policymaker
would, cities should be explicit about all
of their tournament objectives, keeping in
mind both intended and unintended con-
sequences. A simple example from the
hygiene prediction context is the need for
specifying tradeoffs between minor, major,
and severe violations. Through conver-
sations with stakeholders, a complete set
of design objectives can be identified and
then formally integrated into the tourna-
ment scoring function (for further discus-
sion, see Luca, Kleinberg and Mullainathan
(2016)).
B. Choosing Data
Finding the relevant data for a prediction
tournament requires a systematic approach
to determining the value of different data
sets, as well as collaboration with partner
organizations. Beginning with internal data
is sensible, but that data may lack criti-
cal information or be low-frequency. In the
hygiene prediction competition, prior vio-
lations provided a good signal about future
violations, but the frequency and scope of
the Yelp data allowed for finer predictions.
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C. Incentives and Information
Competitors are driven by a variety of
motives, from prize money to job market
signaling to just the opportunity to work on
interesting and important problems; cities
have considerable flexibility in leveraging
all of these incentives. For example, city
governments have the ability to generate
publicity, partially because they have mem-
bers (like the Mayor) who are covered reg-
ularly by the media. Tournament design-
ers must decide how and at which stages
to use publicity—upfront media attention
can serve to inform prospective participants
and generate competition, while ex post
publicity serves to increase the signaling
value of winning.
D. Choosing a Platform
As our theory indicates, the talent pool
largely determines the success of the tour-
nament. At this point, the main prediction
tournament platforms have developed their
own distinct user followings. On larger
platforms such as Kaggle, there are more
than 450,000 registered data scientists who
all receive an email when each competition
begins. A tournament’s designer should
look for a platform that has run similar
tournaments in the past, and should look
at prior tournaments’ outcome statistics to
get estimates of participation and expected
performance.
E. Measuring Success
It is essential to choose metrics for evalu-
ating both (1) tournament participants and
(2) the overall value of the tournament it-
self. Whenever possible, it is optimal to
score entries according to information col-
lected after the close of submissions—as we
did in the Evaluation Phase—so as to have
a true out-of-sample test.8 And of course,
tournaments are not free, and thus should
only be used if they deliver value that ex-
ceeds costs. As we mentioned in Section II,
8Additionally, it is important to figure out a clear
way of communicating the scoring system to tournament
participants.
we have evaluated (and are continuing to
evaluate) the value of the prediction tour-
nament itself by asking how much the win-
ning algorithms can improve the allocation
of inspector time in Boston in practice.
IV. Conclusion
Open tournaments are a new and exciting
tool for leveraging latent, low-cost talent
to solve cities’ problems. However, tour-
naments are not a panacea, as they have
downside risk and involve duplication of
effort. Tournaments are thus most effec-
tive when (1) the organizers are comfortable
with project risk and (2) an abundant sup-
ply of low-cost labor is available. In the case
of Boston, the needed conditions were met,
and our hygiene prediction tournament suc-
cessfully sourced algorithms that can im-
prove inspector allocation.
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